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Appendix  16 1. Introduction 
The third generation, life and non-life insurance directives adopted in 19921 completed 
the  Community  legislative  framework  necessary  for  the  establishment  of the  single 
licence  for  EU  insurance  undertakings,  the  so-called  "European  passport",  thereby 
realising the  single market in the field of insurance.  This  single licence relies on co-
ordination  of essential  rules  concerning  the  prudential  and  financial  supervision  of 
insurance  undertakings.  These  rules  seek to  ensure  policyholders'  protection and  the 
stability of financial markets.- Provisions concerning the solvency margin of insurance 
undertakings were partly updated by the third generation directives, but their essential 
features were already subject to especially detailed harmonisation from the outset, that is 
from the date of  the first generation insurance directives2. 
During the Council discussions on the third directives, it was felt that the latter provisions 
ought  to  be  reviewed  beyond  this  update,  but  that,  in  order  not  to  delay  further 
completion of  the insurance single market, the review exercise should take place at a lat~r 
date.  The  Council,  in  agreement  with the  Commission,  therefore  included  respective 
articles in the third generation directives3 obliging  the Commission to present a report to 
the Insurance Committee within three years of the implementation of the two directives 
on "the need for further harmonisation of  the solvency margin". 
The present report is intended to  fulfil  the Commission's legal obligation towards the 
Insurance Committee; its objective is  to  examine the present solvency schemes for life 
and non-life insurance undertakings and to assess whether changes are required in order 
that the solvency rules continue to fulfil  their purpose in the light of today' s economic 
and  financial  context.  This  assessment  needs  to  be  based  on the  experience  of EU 
insurance  supervisory  authorities,  since  the  Commission  does  not  have  a  direct 
supervisory responsibility and therefore lacks its own empirical data. It also needs to take  . 
due  accoun~ of other expertise,  such as  that of actuaries practising in the EU  and the 
insurance industry itself. 
At  the  meeting. of the  Insurance  Committee  (I  C)  in  April  1994,  the  Commission 
discussed for the first time with IC Members this solvency review. It was agreed that the 
Conference  of Insurance  Supervisory  Departments  of European  Community Member 
States  ("the  Conference") would  be  asked  to  establish a  working  group to  look  into 
solvency issues in a broad sense and to report back to  the Commission by the  end of 
1996. This working group, established under the chairmanship of  Dr. MUller of  the BAV4 
'(here~fter called  the  MUller  Group),  has  prepared  a  report  which  was  discussed  and 
agreed  by  the  Conference  in  April  1997  and,  shortly  afterwards,  submitted  to  the 
Commission.  This  document  has  already  been  published  by  the  Conference  and  is 
therefore not annexed to the present report5·6. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Non-life insurance: directive 92/49/EEC and life insurance: directive 92/96/EEC. 
' 
Non-life insurance: directive 73/239/EEC and life insurance: directive 79/267/EEC. 
Article 25 in the third non-life insurance directive and article 26 in the third life insurance directive. 
Bundesaufsichtsamt fUr das Versicherungswesen, the German insurance supervisory authority. 
The  MUller  Group  report  can  be  obtained  from  the  Secretariat  of  the  Conference,  care  of 
Mrs Gougeon  or  Mrs Rotte-Capet:  teledoc  649,  Ministere  de  I' Economic  et  des  Finances, 
2 In parallel, the Commission sent a questionnaire, closely based on a questionnaire used 
by the MUller  Group, to three European federations representing EU  actuaries and the 
insurance industry (namely the CEA', ACME
7  and  Groupe Consultatif des Actuaires). 
All three federations delivered their replies to the Commission by the end of 1996. As 
these replies may be obtained from the organisations concerrned, they are not attached to 
the present report 
2. Overview of the rules aimed at ensuring the solvency of  insur~nce undertakings. 
The solvency of  an insusance undertaking refers to its capacity to respect, at any time, its 
commitments to policyholders and, more generally, to any creditor. The measurement of 
solvency depends crucially on the way assets and liabilities are assessed.  The two third 
generation  insurance  directives  and  the  Insurance  annual  and  consolidated  accounts 
directive (directive 911674/EEC) have harmonised, in great detail for  certain items, the 
principles for  the calculation of liabilities and  for  the  valuation of assets of insurance 
undertakings. However, those rules have only been in force for a few year!f and it is,  ip 
the Commission's view, too early to evaluate whether they need to  be  reviewed.  They 
will  therefore  be  considered  as  given  for  the  present  and  will  not  be  dealt  with 
specifically in this report. Nevertheless, should the continuing work on solvency margin 
suggest that the valuation rules for assets and liabilities of insurance undertakings ought 
to be amended or supplemented, the Commission would be prepared to take full account 
of  such a conclusion. 
The :main liabilities of an insurance undertaking are its technical provisions (sometimes 
called mathematical provisions in life insurance) which are established in order to  cover 
the anticipated claims and associated costs arising from  the  policies underwritten.  They 
are calculated on an actuarial and  statistical basis,  but  this  cannot provide an absolute 
guarantee that they will always be sufficient to cover all claims and costs. Therefore, and 
in order to protect policyholders and to  ensure the  stability of financial  markets,  it  has 
appeared  necessary  to  require  insurance  undertakings  to  hold  a  certain  amount  of 
additional  resources  to  act  as  a  buffer  in  the  event  that  unexpected  losses  and  costs 
emerge.  This  buffer  is  called  the  solvency  margin,  and  the  minimum  buffer  which 
insurance undertakings must maintain is termed the solvency margin requirement. 
The  solvency  margin  requirement  should  be  capable  of absorbing  -assuming  the 
continuing operation of the insurance undertaking- the effect of non-4uantitied risks and 
the impact of an underestimation of, or unusual fluctuations  in,  quantified risks already 
covered  elsewhere  (typically  by  the  teclmical  provisions).  Tht!  objective  is  to  give 
undertakings and the supervisory authorities time to correct the situation once such risks 
have materialised. 
------------------------------------------------------------------
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Furthermore,  a  tirst  orientation  debate  was  held  in  the  Insura1h:l:  Committee  in  April  1997  on  the 
elements justifying the  nct:d  for  further  harmonisation  of the  solvcul.y  margin.  The  present  rt:port 
takes full account of  this debate. 
Com ite  Europeen  des  Assurances,  representing  EU  insurance  undertakings  lim ikd  by  shares  and 
certain  mutual  insurance  undertakings;  Association  des  Assureurs  Cooperatifs  ct  Mutualistcs 
Europcens, represt:nting other EU mutual and co-operative insurance undertakings. 
3 Finally, insurance undertakings are, like all supervised financial undertakings, subject to 
specific  requirements  concerning  the  suitability  of shareholders  and  the  fitness  and 
properness of  management (as in the non-life and life insurance directives) and additional 
requirements concerning the transparency of  the corporate and group structures (directive 
95/26/EC, also called the "BCCI follow-up directive"). 
3. Empirical data concerning the solvency margin of EU insurance undertakings 
a/ Actual solvency maq:in 
The table in the appendix presents empirical data relating to the solvency margin of EU 
insurance undertakings as at the end of 1995, collected from the respective supervisory 
authorities.  At  that  date,  the  solvency~ margin  of  insurance  ·undertakings  was 
ECU 321  829 million,  for a total solvency margin requirement of ECU 88 494 million. 
By  way  of  comparison,  the  total  investments  by  insurance  undertakingss  were 
ECU 2 120 979 million9. 
The table also shows the absolute and relative level of  the different elements eligible for 
the solvency margin. In particular, it can be seen that own funds, in other words paid-up 
capital (or initial  fund  for  mutual undertakings),  reserves and  profits  brought forward, 
plus hidden reserveslO (where relevant) amount to  77% of the total solvency margin for 
life  insurance  and  93%  for  non-life  insurancell.  Profit reserves  represent  17% of the 
solvency margin of life insurers. On the other hand, own funds substitutes, that is to say 
subordinated loans, cumulative preferential shares and other securities with no  specified 
maturity amount to  2% of the solvency margin elements of life and non-life insurance 
undertakings taken together (but 9% for the sole non-life mutual insurance undertakings). 
As  regards the other elements, unpaid capital (or initial fund for mutual undertakings) 
amounts  to  0.3%  of the  total  solvency  marginl2;  future  profits  constitute  4%  of the 
solvency  margin  of life  insurance  undertakings;  lastly  supplementary  contributions 
represent 11% of  the solvency margin of non-life mutual insurance undertakings. 
8  Source: Eurostat. 
9  This figure excludes Greece and Ireland. 
10  Where they are admitted and for the purpose of this presentation, hidden reserves have been taken into 
account along with  own  funds  in  order to  present homogeneous data  irrespective of the  accounting 
options in  force  in the different Member States, since whether or not hidden  reserves are  included  in 
an  insurance undertaking's own  funds depends on the accounting option adopted. 
11  Percentages  in  this paragraph exclude the United Kingdom (see appendix). 
l2  This pcn.:cntagc c'cludl'S G~Tillany (see appendix). 
4 b/ Solvency mariin reQuirement 
b .,.  1 - Non-life insurance 
By way of  a summary presentation, which is adopted  here for the purpose of  facilitating 
the  understanding  of the  present  report,  tl}e  solvency  margin  requirement  can  be 
expressed as  the higher of  two results: 
- 16%  of the  annual  premiums  written  by  the  insurance  undertaking  (18%  up  to  a 
certain premium volume) or 
- 23% of the average annual claims costs incurred by the insurance undertaking (26% 
up to a certain claim volume). 
The result is  then multiplied by  a reduction factor equal  to  the  ratio of claims  costs 
remaining  for  the  insurance  undertaking  after taking account of reinsurap~e ceded to 
gross claims costs, as resulting from the last financial year (with a lower limit of 50%).· 
The total  solvency margin requirement for  non-life insurance at the end of 1995  was 
~CU  28 098 million. The average reinsurance factorl3 was 85%. 
b - 2 - Life insurance 
The solvency margin requirement may be summarised as the sum of  two results: 
- 4% of  the mathematical provisions of  the insurance t.indertaking plus 
0.3% of the capital at risk (an amount equal to the difference between the maximum 
payments under the policies underwritten and the mathematical provisions). 
In fact, before aggregation, as in non-life insurance, each of these amounts is multiplied 
by  a  reduction  factor  for  reinsurance,  taking  account  of the  effect  of reinsurance 
respectively on the mathematical provisions and on the capital at risk (with lower limits 
respectively of 85% and 50%). The total solvency margin requirement for life insurance 
at the end of 1995 was ECU 60 396 million. The average reinsurance factor13 was 97%. 
4. Assessment of the operation of the present solvency margin scheme 
a/ The present scheme has proved satisfactory 
In order to  assess  the  operation of the  present  solvency  margin  scheme,  two  aspects 
shoula- be  examined:  on  the  one  hand,  whether  insolvency  cases  of. insurance 
undertakings have been many or few since the harmonised scheme was introduced and, 
on the other hand, whether insolvency cases which occurred could have been avoided by 
insurance undertakings' being subject to a different  sche~e or supervisory authorities' 
having different means of  intervention. 
The  question  of whether  the  current  solvency  margin  requirement  might  have  been 
excessive  was  also  examined.  As  regards  the  supervisory  authorities,  only  two 
delegations in the MUller Group considered that the solvency margin requirement could 
be  reduced,  and  this  concerned  only  very  specific  insurance  contracts.  As  regards 
13  This  factor  is  calculated  for  the  following  Member  States:  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Luxembourg and Portugal.  · 
5 insurance undertakings, it was not considered that the solvency margin requirement had 
been excessive or had  impeded the growth of EU  insurance industry.  Nevertheless,  in 
advocating simplification of the solvency margin requirement for non-life insurance, the 
insurance  industry  wishes  to  retain  only  the  lower  coefficients  contained  in  current 
Community legislation for the calculations based on premiums and claims (respectively 
16%  and  23%).  Conversely,  while  all  EU  supervisory  authorities  also  declared 
themselves favourable to such a simplification, they supported the idea that percentages 
at least equal to the higher coefficients should, alone, continue to  be used (respectively 
18% and 26%).  These considerations lead  to  the  conclusion that the  current solvency 
margin  requirement  cannot  be  considered  as  excessive,  and  hence  the  present  report 
focuses on weaknesses in the current Community solvency margin scheme. 
The exercise of identifying cases  and analysing the causes of. deficiencies of insurance 
undertakings in European Economic Area countries in the past 20 years was conducted 
by  the  Muller  Group.  Supervisors  found  that  there  have  been  only  a  few  cases  of 
deficiencies. A significant proportion of  these could be remedied through capital  increas~ 
or by  takeover by  other insurance undertakings or holding companies14,  thus  avoiding 
final  insolvency and winding-up.  These findings  tend to  show that the  overall  scheme 
designed to guarantee the solvency of insurance undertakings, including the adequacy of 
the  solvency  margin,  has  operated  satisfactorily.  In  particular,  they  provide  some 
evidence that the solvency margin satisfactorily fulfilled its function as an early warning 
system thus giving time to the undertakings concerned and the supervisory authorities to 
rectify the emerging problems 
Closer examination of these cases of deficiency allows some fine-tuning of the analysis. 
Deficiencies could only be  attributed to  weaknesses  in the  solvency margin scheme if 
they  were  not  due  to  dramatic  lack  of compliance  with  other  requirements  to  which 
insurance undertakings are  subject.  However,  the  problems which occurred and  which 
were not remedied were in  most cases due  to  an accumulation of several shortcomings 
among  the  following  types:  inexperienced  or  non-professional  management, 
inappropriate  underwriting  policy,  imprudent  investments,  insufficient  provisions, 
inadequate  reinsurance  policy.  high  losses  due  to  rapid  growth,  double  gearing 15  or 
d~tnmental transactions  involving  other  entities  belonging  to  the  same  group  as  the 
insurance  undertaking,  and  of course fraud I misdemeanours.  The  Commission accepts 
and shares the analysis ret1ected in the MUller Group report: 
"It  1ms fi:nmd  that even i(  the  solvency [margin] rules had been applied and observed 
marl  strict/_,..  and even  ~( they  had contained stricter  requirements  than  they  do  at 
presem.  a  numher  of rhe  economic  collapses  that  happened  could  not  have  been 
pre1·emed.  The  .10/rency margin as a rule fulfils  its warning and safety jimction but it 
Li1v~n that  th~ analys1s of past deficiencies has been carried out thoroughly in the Muller Grout' :·-i'  ... 
the present document docs not undertake to present a full  analysis.  Rather ..  t relies on  the findings by 
Luropean supcr\'isory authorities and presents in a synthetic manner what conclusions the Commission 
draws from this experience. 
Doublt:  gearing  reters back to the  fact  that,  where  an  insurance  undertaking owns a participation  in 
anothl·r onl'.  a prnpol1ion  of the solvency margin  of the  former  is  invested  in  the  latter,  and  is  thus 
cngagcd  tor  the  protection  of the  latter's  policyholders.  Double  gearing.  as  well  as  intra-group 
transactions. arc dcalt with in a proposal for a directive ("On Insurance Undertakings which are Part of 
an  Insurance liroup") presently being discussed by the European Parliament and the Council. 
6 does  not  at  all  replace  an  effective  company  analysis  and  even  less  a  prudent 
establishment and coverage of  the technical provisions." 
b/ However. certain weaknesses have been identified in specific cases 
These  positive  findings  must  not  hide  the  fact  that  certain  cases  of deficiency  have 
pointed to  weaknesses in the solvency margin scheme.  Indeed,  the work of the MUller 
Group bas shown that, in certain, well defined instances, difficulties encountered by, or 
failures  of,  insurance  undertakings  could  have  been  addressed  by  a  more  accurate 
solvency margin regime. Such difficulties occurred more particularly in relation to long-
settlement risks in non-life insurance, investment and asset-liability mismatches, rapidly 
growing eotreprises, inadequate reinsurance taken out by  an insurance undertaking, but 
also  in  relation  to  the  legal  incapacity  of the  supervisory  authorities  to  intervene 
sufficiently in advance of the insurance undertaking's problems becoming irreversible. 
Possible consequences of  these findings are discussed later in this report. 
c/  The  maio  existina  alternative  schemes  have  not  proved  their  superiority  1!L  the 
Community approach and therefore do not need to  be  introduced in lim,of the current 
Community reaime to respond to the identified weaknesses 
More analytical systems have been introduced outside the European Union,  notably the 
risk-based capital scheme as used in the United States of America16• Similarly, variants 
of the  RBC  approach have been used for  many  years by rating agencies to  assess the 
ability  of American  insurance  undertakings  to  pay  their  debts,  and  their  use  is  also 
increasing, subject to some adaptations, in relation to European insurers. The superiority 
of such  approaches,  in  the  way  they  have  been  implemented,  over  the  Community 
regulatory  approach  has  not  been  demonstrated.  Such  models  are  characterised  in 
particular  by  their  complexity  and  comparatively  greater  arbitrariness.  The  European 
insurance industry criticises the RBC approach on a number of counts. The Commission, 
along with  EU supervisory authorities, note that, although the  short experience gained 
with  such models  does not permit their  rejection,  neither  does  it  create  an  objective 
incentive at this stage to privilege them over the EU approach altogether. Nevertheless, it 
will be interesting to draw lessons from them where appropriate. 
ln addition, it is important to note that the present EU regime is soon to be complemented 
by the supplementary supervision of insurance undertakings which form  part of a larger 
insurance group (see footnote 15). As a result, but subject of course to the outcome of the 
current legislative process, double gearing will be eliminated and intra-group transactions 
will  t)OW he monitored. Consequently, two of the most frequently  mentioned causes (as 
identified  above)  for  insolvency  will  be  dealt  with,  on the  basis  of the  existing  EU 
scheme, by specific provisions. 
The Commission therefore considers that the principles governing the operation of the 
present EU  regime should be maintained. This does not mean of course that some mon: 
detailed arrangements cannot be adjusted and supplemented, on the basis of the present 
regime.  in  order  to  correct  any  inadequacies  that' have  been  identified  (as  mentioned 
abo\·e). 
1(,  The American ROC approach is presented in the appendices to the Miillcr Group report. 
7 dl Any unnecessary additional cost for the industry should be avoided 
In line with the above analysis, the Commission considers that the review exercise should 
not have the effect of increasing unnecessarily the general level of the regulatory burden 
imposed on the industry. It is important in this respect to emphasise that an unjustified 
increase could be expected to have the following negative effects. It would: 
- cause considerable difficulty to a significant proportion of EU insurance undertakings: 
the comfortably high solvency ratio (effective solvency margin over solvency margin 
requirement) of 3.6  in  average  (see  section  3-a)  should not conceal the  fact  that a 
number of small undertakings or even medium sized or large undertakings do present 
a  solvency  ratio  close  to  111.  For those  businesses,  a  sudden rise  in  the  solvency 
margin requirement might provoke considerable financial  difficulty even though,  as 
past experience shows, their ultimate solvency may not be materially threatened; 
curb  the  competitiveness  of the  European  insurance  industry  in  term~ ·of growth 
capacity, as  any increase in risks provided for  (life insurance) or turnover-or clairris 
costs  (non life  insurance)  implies  a corresponding  increase  in the  solvency  margin 
requirement; 
- increase cost of  taking insurance for consumers as insurers would, at least partly, pass 
on extra costs to the policyholders through the premiums; 
discourage  investment  in  the  insurance  field  as  funds  "blocked"  m  msurance 
undertakings would increase in relative terms; 
- create (or reinforce an already existing) tendency to establish imprudent premiums and 
technical provisions to  compensate for  the rise in the solvency margin requirement, 
given that these parameters are components of the basis on which the requirement is 
calculated (see section 3-b above). 
Therefore,  considering  the  assessment  of the  operation  of the  ex1stmg  scheme,  a 
systematic increase in the solvency margin requirement would not seem to be justified. 
Increases may however be desirable concerning specific risk profiles which have been 
identified  by  EU  supervisory  authorities  as  having  caused  cases  of insolvency  for 
insurance  undertakings  (as  mentioned  in  section  4-b  above).  Furthermore,  de  facto 
increases  may  result ·in any  case  for  certain  individual  undertakings  from  updating 
minimum monetary thresholds contained in the solvency margin regulations or from re-
examil}ing  the  list  of solvency  margin  elements,  as  discussed  later  in  this  report.  In 
addition,  when  elimination  of double  gearing  (see  section 4-c  above)  is  generalised 
throughout the EU, insurance undertakings which are part of an insurance group will be 
subject to still further solvency margin constraints. 
It might be  argued that raising the solvency margin requirement, even targeted on well 
defined risk situations, would be an excessive response to deal with only a few cases of 
insolvency.  However,  the  Commission  is  not  convinced  by  this  argument and  would 
stress the following considerations: 
l7  Sometimes, such undertakings can even be  in  a comfortable situation where their overall solvency is 
concerned thanks, for example, to prudently calculated tariffs and technical provisions. 
8 analysis shows that some of the insolvency cases arose  as the result of risk situations 
which do  not correspond only to isolated undertakings,  but characterise risk profiles 
which can generally  be  found  among the  industry.  In  such cases,  insolvency  cases 
contributed to revealing weaknesses in the operation of the existing solvency margin 
scheme which should be corrected; 
it  is  generally considered that,  due to  increasing competition  in  the  context of the 
opening of the markets, international industry concentration and the development of 
new distribution channels, the overall profit margin of insurance business, at least in 
its  most  traditional  forms,  has  decreased  and  might  continue  to  decrease. 
Simultaneously, certain categories of risks increase in terms of  concentration and cost 
and new risks appear. Identifying and responding  to particularly sensitive risk profiles 
therefore appears to be a consistent and prudential policy and, as such, desirable; 
responding to weaknesses or inadequacies of the solvency margin scheme in special 
cases  may  also  take  the  form  of a  more  flexible  solution,  consisting· of giving 
supervisory authorities the legal means to  intervene in anticipation - in other words, 
even if  the actual solvency margin is greater than that required. This would help avoid 
an  unjustified,  systematic  increase  in  the  general  level  of the  solvency  margin 
requirement (discussed later in this report). 
e/ Conclusion 
As  a  global  assessment of the  operation of the  solvency  margin  scheme,  the  current 
arrangements  have  proved  to  be  soundly  based  as  to  principle  and  satisfactory  as  to 
practical  results.  The solvency margin has  fulfilled  its  role as a cushion of own funds 
coming on top of  other requirements aiming at ensuring solvency, as the small number of 
bankruptcies  linked  to  an  inadequate  solvency  margin  - as  well  as  the  case  study  of 
difticulties which occurred - show.  Another advantage of this scheme, also stressed by 
the  European  insurance  industry,  resides  in  its  relative  simplicity.  The  Commission 
considers that clarity and stability of the solvency margin regime are important features 
for  the  good  operation  of the  industry  and  the  ability  of third  parties  (customers, 
employees,  investors,  financial  analysts, ... )  to  understand  it;  these  features  are  also 
relevant in the perspective ofthe enlargement of  the EU. 
In  conclusion,  the  Commission  considers  it·  desirable  for  the  current  Community 
requirements  regarding the  level of the  solvency margin to  be  maintained.  However, 
amendments could be made to correct clearly identified inadequacies. Every effort should 
then be made to avoid any additional cost for the industry, except in the case of specific 
risk situations for which the current level of  the requirement proves to be inadequate. 
5.  Discussion  on  issues  (JOinting  to  inadequacies of the  present solvency  margin 
scheme and thus justifying further harmonisation 
In addition to  the lessons to  be  drawn from  past insolvency cases in relation to  certain 
specific risk profiles a number of more general questions also need to be raised in order 
to  achieve better harmonisation of the solvency margin scheme, and thus to  secure the 
foundations of the European passport. The issues discussed in the present section are of 
two types:  tirst, technical points which have arisen from the analysis of past insolvency 
cases  and  secondly,  more  general  points  which  were  not  fully  harmonised  by  the 
adoption of the third generation directives and which have also been highlighted by  the 
supervisory authorities, notably in the Mi.iller Group report. 
9 .. 
·- . 
The  objective of this  section  is  to  set  out  the  Commission's  view  that,  given  the 
experience accumulated in the past 20 years, further work should be done to improve and 
deepen harmonisation of the  solvency  margin  provisions  contained  in  the  insurance 
directives. The following list of issues does not seek to be exhaustive; nor  does it seek to 
provide at this stage technical solutions to the problems raised. Subject to the results of 
the discussion  in  the  Insurance  Committee on  the  basis of the  present report,  il is 
proposed  that a  working group of govenuncnt experts chaired by the Commission's 
services  should  oe  set  up.  This- group  should  study  in  dctaif tbe  most  appropriate 
responses to problems identified through the substantial work already carried out by the 
Miiller  Group  nnd  by  the  replies  from  industry  and  actuaries  to  the  Commission 
questionnaire. as well  as  other issues arising  from the  review of the solvency  margin 
~------~ : ·~n~·----------------------------------
a/ Composition of  the solvencv margin 
" - 1- Re-examination of  the list ojsol1·ency margin items 
As provided  for  in  the  insurance directives,  the solvency  margin  of life and non-life 
insi1rance undertakings consists of  their "assets[.  .. ] free of  any foreseeable liabilities, less 
any intangible items.'' An open"ended fist of such assets  is then given in the directives, 
with  certain  variations between  life and  non-life  insurance.  Three  aspects  of such a 
definition call for further reflection and work (see also the MUller Group report). 
The expressions '·free of  any foreseeable liabilities" and "intangible items" should be 
clarified and.  probably.  improved.  Indeed,  the third generation· insurance directives 
introduced  0 \\'ll  funds  substitutes  in  the  list  of  solvency  .margin  elements  in 
recognition  of  the  evolution  of available  forms  of financial  resources  and of the 
potential role of  such items for the insurance sector. Among those items, subordinated 
loans for example are not "free of any foreseeable liability'' in the strictest sense, in 
spite of  the numerous conditions laid down by the directives for them to be e!igible for 
the  soh·ency margin. In addition, it appears desirable  to specify the meaning of the 
expression ''intangible items'', as certain immaterial  items are indeed eligible for the 
soh·ency  margin.  such  as  supplementary contributions  for  mutual  undertakings  or 
future profits for lile insurance undertakings.  · 
Without a clnscd-list of  solvency margin items. it  \VCJUid  seem to  be difficult to argue 
that tho.:  in~urancc directives offer a systematic guarantee that insurance undertakings 
meet  Cl>m)'~rabk  prud~nt ial criteria.  Therefore  in the  interest of  legal security and 
eq~•ivakncc of  prudential standards throughout the European Union, the question of 
dosing this  list should be raised, but without prejudice to the existing possibility for 
Member States to refuse certain elements on the closed list for the solvency margin. 
From  :1  procedural  viewpoint,  once the  list  is  closed and,  given  the necessity  for 
insurance legislation· to keep pace as much as possible with market developments - in 
parti c~:!.,r  in  the  field  "mding sources.  it would  seem  desirable  to  consider  o. 
>imr'•t-·:•l proc.:dure for reviewing th.: list in the future. 
l'he  :1•":1·1: '•t:ms  in  the  open-ended soh·~ncy margin lists  in the directives should 
the:·• :.:J·  .  he '.trdully re-examined.  L-or .:xampk. "hile !he lcgilimacy 0 1' admitting 
paid  .1·  h.m.:  ,:.pii:JI and reservo.:s  as d ements  eligible  for the solvency  margin  is 
unal" m• ·ml:.  .\•.:cpl<::l  hy  supervisory  authorities.  views  differ  concerning  !he 
opr• •!'J!Ilt\ •o  :~ o.l.miJ  11<'n pa1d-up share capilal. Similarly. supervisory authorities have 
dif:._,  •  . ' ~" ,  .:nnc~rn111g  1h~ opportunity lo admil  li1turc  profits of life insurance 
·m 1,  -·  ·~.  1 >  !h~.;  Con11ni::..sion· s ,·(.;w is 1hat  only  ac.:tual  resources of an insul'ancc 
10 undertaking  should  be  accepted  as  solvency  margin  elements  and  in  that  respect 
considers that the elements more particularly mentioned in this indent deserve proper 
scrutiny in the course of  revising the solvency margin scheme. 
' 
a - 2 - Quality of  the items representing the guarantee fund 
Life  insurance  directives  provide  that  at  least  half of the  guarantee  fundiB  of life 
insurance undertakings must be made up of  items belonging to a closed sub-list of  the list 
of solvency  margin  elements,  considered  as  being  of higher  quality.  The  m.inimum 
guarantee fund 
18  must be made up totally of such higher quality items.  This provision 
gives rise to the following two remarks: 
The  sub-list of items  composing  at  least  half of the  guarantee  fund  and  the  total 
minimum  guarantee  fund  should  undergo  further  scrutiny.  Among  other  issues,  it 
should be  discussed whether it  is  appropriate  to  include  in  it,  as  is  now the  case, 
unpaid share capital, as the latter does not appear to  be as  financially secure as other 
solvency margin items. 
It seems  necessary  to  assess  whether  a  similar  sub-list  of higher  quality  solvency 
margin items should be introduced in non-life insurance. 
b/ Calculation of  the solvency mariin reQuirement 
b - 1 - Long-term risks in the non-life insurance field 
Long-term business in the  non-life  insurance sector has  been  identified  by  the  Muller 
Group  as  posing  particular  problems  associated  with  increased  risks  in  a  number of 
respects:  under-tarification,  under-estimation  of  technical  provisions,  deviation 
(significant  variations  in  claims  frequency  or  cost  with  respect  to  the  assumptions 
governing  the  calculation  of the  technical  provisions),  operating  expenses  and  even 
reinsurance.  One  of  the  EU  insurance  industry  federations  also  stressed  the 
. appropriateness  of  studying  this  issue  further.  However,  the  present  Community 
regulations governing the solvency margin do  not take specific account of such non-life 
long-term risks. 
Insofar as (see section 4 above) the present solvency margin scheme is to  be maintained 
to  the  greatest  possible  extent  while  correcting  its  weaknesses  in  relation  to  well 
identified, specitic risk profiles. there appears to  be  two  possible ways of dealing with 
long-settlement  risk  in  calculating  the  solvency  margin  requirement:  either  by 
introducing  a  third  alternative  index  (in  complement  to  the  premiums  index  and  the 
claims  index)  based  on  technical  provisions,  or  by  adding  a  given  proportion  of the 
technical provisions to the result given by the present scheme. Without taking ·a definitive 
position at  this  stage,  the  Commission takes  note  of the  fact  that,  as  reported  by  the 
MUller Group, a majority of EU supervisory authoriti::c  i::  i'1  favour of the first solution. 
In  approaching a solution in  the  course  01  1uture \\on.:.  :::~  -'-'mmission shall seek that 
which proves the least disruptive to  the present scheme. the most specifically focused on 
the sole long-term business in terms of cost for the industry, and the most apt to avoid or 
minimise undesirable effects such as  encouraging  insurance  undertakings to  adjust the 
I X  The guarantee fund  is  equal  to  the  higher of one third of the  solvency margin  requirement or a fixed 
amount called the minimum guarantee funJ. 
11 level  of technical  provisions  m  order  to  lower  the  cost  of the  solvency  margin 
requirement. 
b - 2 - Investment risk 
EU  supervisory  authorities  have  stressed  that,  "with  reference  to  past  difficulties, 
insufficient account had been taken of  investment risk until now". Indeed, the analysis of 
insolvency cases of insurance undertakings in the EU in the pa5t 20 years shows that a 
number of cases arose out of,_ or were aggravated by,  inappropriate investments and in 
particular concentration of investments  on  poorly  performing  assets  or assets  of low 
security. 
While life insurance solvency margin regulation contains an element covering investment 
risk, this risk is not, as such, taken into account in the solvency margin requirement of 
non-life insurance undertakings. The Commission considers that further reflection should 
be  devoted  to  possible  ways  of  dealing  with  the  investment  risk  of· insurance 
undertakings, more particularly in the non-life insurance sector.  In future  work on this 
issue, two aspects should be borne in mind: 
There  are  already  a  number  of rules  concerning  the  investments  of insurance 
undertakings covering technical provisions, so  that the interplay between these rules 
and  any  possible  solution  further  dealing  with  investment  risk  would  need  to  be 
carefully assessed. 
The investment risk is especially relevant for long term business. 
b - 3 - Excessive costs I Rapid growth risks 
The Commission takes good note of the reference by EU  supervisory authorities to the 
significance of  risks linked to excessive costs in cases of  rapid and uncoordinated growth. 
As these risks are not dealt with in the present solvency margin scheme, further reflection 
should be devoted to this issue. 
b-4- Reinsurance transfers 
As explained in section 3-b above, reinsurance transfers are taken into account in order to 
reduce  the  solvency  margin  requirement  of the  ceding  insurance  undertaking.  EU 
supervisory authorities have stressed that certain occurrences of financial difficulties of 
insurers had been caused by failure of reinsurance cover to work properly. Suggestions 
have .been made  to  allow supervisory authorities  to  have  more  flexibility  to  act upon 
inappropriate  reinsurance cover,  more  particularly  in  the  non-life  insurance  sector.  At 
present, insurance directives provide for flat-rate calculation arrangements which do not 
vary  according  to  the  nature  of the  reinsurance  agreements  or  the  quality  of the 
reinsurers. 
Among  the  special  features  which  need  to  be  looked  at  is  the  case  of financial 
reinsurance, whereby exclusively or mainly financial risk, rather than underwriting risk, 
is  transferred from  the  insurer to  the  reinsurer.  Although financial  reinsurance has not 
been  identified  as  a  cause  for  insolvency  cases  of insurance  undertakings  by  the 
supervisory  authorities'  reports  to  the  MUller  Group,  this  technique,  which  has  been 
developing rapidly, has been singled out by supervisors as deserving particular attention. 
12 b - 5 - Minimum guarantee fund 
The amounts laid down for the minimum guarantee fund have not been amended since 
the various directives were negotiated (most of  the amounts date from the first generation 
directives,  in  other  words  from  1973  and  1979  for  non-life  and  life  insurance 
respectively; however, amounts for tourist assistance were fixed in 1984 and for credit 
and suretyship insurance in 1987). An adjustment of levels in line with past inflationl9 
would now have the effect of multiplying these nominal amounts by a factor of between 
1.8 and 5.3  according to the date on which they were fixed.  The Commission considers 
such an adjustment as being necessary in order to maintain the economic and prudential 
significance of the minimum guarantee fund,  which  is to  ensure that every insurance 
undertaking has the necessary financial  guarantee, which would not be the case if the 
solvency margin requirement were allowed to fall below a certain level. That level, which 
varies according to the insurance classes underwritten by an insurance undertaking, is the 
minimum guarantee fund. 
A similar development, which the MUller Group advocates should take place in parallel 
with the  adjustment in line  with inflation,  would consist  in aligning the level  of the 
minimum guarantee fund of different insurance classes. For instance, a majority of EU 
supervisory authorities in the MUller  Group considered that the level of the minimum 
guarantee fund required for liability insurance shot:lld be increased to the same level as 
that required for credit insurance. The Commission agrees that further thought must be 
devoted to this issue, as well as to other possible adjustments,  ~q order to .acknowledge 
the fact that technological and legal developments have increased the cost and volatility 
of  certain risks . 
.However, in adjusting the level of the minimum guarantee fund,  it appears necessary to 
take due  account of the situation of already  existing  small undertakings,  which would 
have  difficulty  in respecting  significantly increased levels of own funds  requirements. 
There  appears  to  be  a  number  of ways  of dealing  with  this  question,  the  possible 
consequences of which will require further study. Two of them are:  (1) to provide for a 
minimum guarantee fund which would depend on the volume of activity of  the insurance 
undertaking, thus making smaller undertakings subject to a lesser requirement than larger 
undertakings  (with,  however,  a  fixed  absolute  minimum  amount),  or  (2) to  allow  a 
sufficient amount  of time  for  small  undertakings  to  progressively  increase  their  own 
funds base so as to reach the new level of  the minimum guarantee fund. 
In any case, all new insurance undertakings would need to respect the updated standards 
from _the outset. 
c/ Investments as cover for the solvency marain 
The  current  directives  prohibit  Member  States2°  from  imposing  any  restriction 
\Vhatsoever on investments covering the solvency margin. This remark highlights another 
aspect of the above mentioned issue of dealing with the investment risk. The discussion 
here  should  focus  not,  as  discussed  above,  on  measuring  the  investment  risk  and 
reflecting  it  in  the  solvency margin requirement,  but on the  appropriateness of laying 
19  Based on European consumer price indices EUR 12 and EUR 15. Source: Eurostat. 
20  Articles 18 and 21  respectively of  the first non-life and life insurance directives, as amended. 
13 down  supplementary  rules  concerning  the  asset  side  of an  insurance  undertaking's 
balance sheet. The justification of  such an approach would be to ensure that all or part of 
the  assets  counterpart of the  solvency  margin  follow  rules  which  contribute  to  limit 
counterparty risk as well as  interest rate risk and  other market risks.  In any event, all 
investigations in the area of dealing with investment risk should be conducted in parallel 
and should not introduce unnecessary constraints on the investment policy of insurance 
undertakings. 
dl Measures ayailable to the sy.peQ'jsozy authorities 
The  current  directives  specifically  provjde  for  supervisory  authorities  to  act  where 
technical provisions are not calculated satisfactorily, where technical provisions are not 
covered by assets meeting the currency matching and location rules, where the solvency 
margin requirement is not met, or where the solvency margin is lower than the minimum 
guarantee fund. 
'However, one of  the causes identified by EU supervisory authorities for the insolvency af 
insurance  undertakings  resides  in  their  incapacity  to  intervene  in  an  adequately 
preventive manner, in other words, in situations where the different triggering criteria in 
the directives for  supervisory intervention were  not met,  although objective elements, 
permitting the  forecast  of serious  financial  difficulties,  existed.  For this  reason  some 
Member  States  have  implemented  in  their  national  legislation  measures  enabling 
supervisory authorities to intervene with a certain degree of flexibility.  Even so,  there 
have there been examples of financial  difficulties  occurring despite  objectively  based 
presumptions of  threatening insolvency. 
EU supervisory authorities gave  particular emphasis to  this issue in the Muller Group 
report. It is the Commission's view that, the facility to intervene early should be given to 
supervisors in situations where converging pieces of evidence support the presumption 
that the financial position of  an insurance undertaking is at risk, even though the different 
individual quantitative thresholds (i.e. solvency margin requirement, minimum guarantee 
fund, etc.) may well be fully respected. Such evidence can only be examined on a case by 
case basis, particularly in well identified situations, such as rapidly growing enterprises 
or cases of  very specific business conditions. 
e/ Level ofharmonisation 
The recitals  to  the  third  insurance  directives  state  that  "certain provisions  [  ... ]  define 
minimum  standards"2 1  but  fail  to  specify  what  these  are.  This  situation  should  be 
reviewed  in  order  to  establish  clearly  which  provisions  should  be  based  on  strict 
harmonisation  and  which  on  minimum  harmonisation.  The  Commission  notes  the 
diverging  opinions  of EU  supervisory  authorities:  some  request  that  solvency  margin 
provisions  should  be  considered  as  being  min11-:1Um  requirement,  as  is  the  case  with 
Community  le~i::o!~::.. ·  ,1ther  financial  areas  (credit  institutions,  investment  firms). 
while  others  advo~o:ate stncter co-ordination.  The  Commission  also  takes  note  of the 
European insurance industry's opinion that,  for  the  sake of fair  competition within the 
EU.  harmonisation  of solvency  margin  regulation  should  be  regarded  as  strict.  With 
regard to future discussions on this issue, the Commission stresses that the advantages of 
giving  national  legislators  flexibility  to  Jay  down  stricter  rules,  with  the  objective  of 
2!  The 8
111  recital.of directive 92/49/EEC and the 9
111  recital of directive 92:96/EEC. 
14 improving consumer protection, need to  be balanced against the necessity to  ensure co-
. ordinated operation of the insurance single market, with as few regulatory, competitive 
and other barriers as possible remaining. 
6. Conclusion 
Examination of insolvency cases and, more generally, financial difficulties of insurance 
undertakings within the European Union in the past twenty years leads to the conclusion 
that the current solvency margin scheme not only has proved to be soundly based as to 
principle,  but  also  has  produced  satisfactory  results  in  practice.  The  Commission 
therefore considers it desirable for  the current Community arrangements regarding the 
solvency margin to  be  maintained.  However,  detailed  analysis  identifies  a number of 
weaknesses in the existing arrangements where very specific risk profiles are concerned. 
Adjustments  and  improvements  should  therefore  be  made  to  remedy  the  identified 
weaknesses. 
It is therefore intended to set up a working group of government experts, chaired by the 
Commission, to study ways of  bringing relevant improvements to the current Community 
solvency  margin  scheme.  This  working  group  should  take  into  account  all  past 
contributions to the debate on the merits of the existing scheme and in particular the 
comments  expressed  in  the  substantial  report  prepared  by  the  MOller  Group  of EU 
supervisory authorities. This working group should seek to avoid any additional cost for 
the industry, except in the case of specific risk situations for  whj~h the current level of 
the requirement has proved to be inadequate. Finally, it should  ·~eek to assess the impact 
on the insurance industry in the EU of  any new measures proposed. 
The outcome of  this group's work is expected to be twofold: 
- some amendments to current directives might be required; 
- other specific areas of the legal regime aiming at ensuring the solvency of insurance 
undertakings might be identified as requiring further work. · 
Finally,  it  is  believed  that  close  monitoring  of Community  solvency  legislation  for 
insurance undertakings should continue in the future, considering the economic impact of 
such legislation and its central role in the insurance single market. 
15 APPENDIX 
Data concerning the Solvency Margin of EU Insurance Undertakings 
Million E<:Us 
1 
Lim 
Number ol entities  952 
63 543  16 094 
{~"';"~~·:•- ',-r·-,.-!  ••··~·· 
.·····:· 
18 563  5 908 
~  .  ..,.,...;  .•  ,, ...  --4;~;  • .1.;01  ,  •  •  • 
9049 
3 674 
2956 
Solvcnq "  rgin requirement  5 737 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
So'''  :: EU insurance supervisory authorities. 
Co11  ·ositc insurance undertakings are counted both under life and non-life insurance. The solvency margin elementS and requirement respectively 
corr·.sponding to their life and non-life insurance business are broken down in the relevant columns. However, for Greece and the United Kingdom, all data 
coocerning composite insurers are counted under life insurance. 
For Germany, unpaid capital is counted in the row "Paid-up capital+ reserves+ profits brought forward". 
Certain Member States have counted the negative amounts corresponding to intangible assets in the row "Other", 'Yhile other Member States have counted it in the 
row "Paid-up capital +reserves+ profits brought forward". 
The total in each column is greater than the sum of  the different solvency margin elements as they appear in the breakdown in the corresponding column, as the 
breakdowns are not available for the United Kingdom. 
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